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Abstract
The false attribution of autonomy and related concepts to artificial agents that lack the attributed levels of the respective 
characteristic is problematic in many ways. In this article, we contrast this view with a positive viewpoint that emphasizes 
the potential role of such false attributions in the context of robotic language acquisition. By adding emotional displays and 
congruent body behaviors to a child-like humanoid robot’s behavioral repertoire, we were able to bring naïve human tutors 
to engage in so called intent interpretations. In developmental psychology, intent interpretations can be hypothesized to play 
a central role in the acquisition of emotion, volition, and similar autonomy-related words. The aforementioned experiments 
originally targeted the acquisition of linguistic negation. However, participants produced other affect- and motivation-related 
words with high frequencies too and, as a consequence, these entered the robot’s active vocabulary. We will analyze par-
ticipants’ non-negative emotional and volitional speech and contrast it with participants’ speech in a non-affective baseline 
scenario. Implications of these findings for robotic language acquisition in particular and artificial intelligence and robotics 
more generally will also be discussed.
Keywords Language acquisition · Developmental robotics · Artificial intelligence · Human–robot interaction
1 Introduction
Humans appear to have the general tendency to interpret 
events and processes of unknown origin in agent-centric 
ways (Levinson 1995). In other words, human intelligence 
is lopsided, with a preference for social explanations when 
confronted with effects and processes of unknown origin and 
causation. This ‘cognitive skewness’ may be a side effect of 
our intelligence being the intelligence of a highly social spe-
cies. Beyond this strong tendency to assume social reasons 
and human or, at least, agentic causation, there is a second, 
but possibly related tendency: the attribution of psychologi-
cal and biological qualities to objects and technical artifacts 
which they genuinely do not possess, or which they possess 
to a lesser degree than is attributed to them. This tendency 
seems to be especially strong when humans perceive a lack 
in meaningful connections to other humans as is the case 
when they feel lonely (Epley et al. 2008). In the context 
of this special issue, the most relevant qualities amongst 
these are attributed autonomy and agency. Scheutz (2011) 
has pointed out the danger of users falsely attributing emo-
tions to social robots in that emotionally unidirectional may 
be detrimental for genuine reciprocal human relationships. 
As we will outline below, the attribution of emotion is one 
element of the attribution of agency more generally.
In this paper, we will conduct an analysis of robot-
directed speech based on speech transcripts originating 
from a set of experiments that targeted the acquisition and 
grounding of linguistic negation (Förster et al. 2018, 2019). 
These recordings were analyzed in the past with an exclusive 
focus on negation words such as “no” or “don’t”, many of 
which can be linked to so called intent interpretations on the 
pragmatic level. These intent interpretations appear to be lin-
guistic indicators of the attribution of autonomy or agency. 
While we focused exclusively on negative intent interpre-
tations in the aforementioned studies, the current analysis 
extends the scope to include their positive counterparts.
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One problem that we are facing, when trying to isolate 
linguistic evidence of attributions of autonomy or agency 
is a lack of consensus in the robotics community as to what 
precisely constitutes each of these two concepts. There are 
numerous features that are stated to be important for both 
concepts and, to make matters worse, having motivation or 
volition, being able to experience emotions, and the capac-
ity to govern one’s own actions are frequently mentioned as 
such central features.
1.1  Agency and autonomy: two overlapping 
concepts
Before discussing the ways in which perceptions of agency 
and autonomy are commonly quantified, it is opportune to 
first introduce the concepts themselves. While agency and 
autonomy are rarely discussed explicitly side-by-side, one 
rare occasion is provided by Scheutz (2011). Citing Buss 
(2002), he adopts a philosophical definition of being autono-
mous as “to be a law to oneself”, including the statement 
that “autonomous agents are self-governing agents” (ibid.). 
Scheutz subsequently boils the relationship between auton-
omy and agency down to the formula “Autonomy + Mobil-
ity = Agency”. Precisely contrary to the current authors’ 
intuition, autonomy is here the more general concept and 
agency a sub concept thereof. Mobility, which we would 
have thought of as a crucial ingredient for autonomy, and 
which is frequently part of the relevant psychological scales, 
is made a feature of agency here that sets it apart from 
autonomy more generally. Brincker (2016), discussing the 
perception of agency and its potential role for interaction, 
seems to be more in agreement with the present authors’ 
intuition in regarding agency as the more general of the two 
concepts—perceived autonomy is seen here as one of the 
“ingredients” of perceived agency. Of some relevance for 
our data analyses will be the fact that Brincker, referenc-
ing the enactivist notion of autopoiesis (Varela et al. 1974), 
links up perceived agency with the perception of an agent 
having some form of metabolism [see also Gahrn-Andersen 
(2020) for a discussion of perceived vs. naturalistic auton-
omy]. Brincker also relates perceived agency to the perceiv-
ing agents’ third- and second-person view of the observed 
agent’s affordance field.1 Of particular interest for our pur-
poses is her observation that spatially co-located agents, 
when entering a reciprocal interaction,2 adopt a second-per-
son view of the shared affordance field. This view is ought 
to provide them with a particularly rich access to aspects of 
each other’s agency. In this context, emotional expressions 
play an important role within the “triangulating dynamics” 
that both agents engage in when negotiating each other’s 
roles, interpretations, and when trying to align or differenti-
ate their respective perspective on the world. Here then, we 
find a connection between the role of emotional displays and 
attribution of agency and autonomy.
1.2  Perceptions of agency and autonomy
In psychology, a popular tool for assessing the perception of 
some particular quality is the scale or questionnaire. When 
searching for scales that would assess the perception of 
agency and autonomy, respectively, we failed to find one 
definite scale that most researchers in human–robot interac-
tion (HRI) would utilize. Instead, we encountered a number 
of scales with the help of which perceptions of either of the 
two concepts are ought to be quantified. Within all these 
scales, however, the respective factor, agency or autonomy, 
was only one amongst several others. In other words, we are 
unaware of any scale that would assess perceived autonomy 
or perceived agency exclusively and which would have been 
designed for this designated purpose.
Most scales for assessing perceived autonomy appear 
to support our naïve intuition that autonomy seems to be 
strongly linked to physical mobility. The EmCorp scale 
(Hoffmann et al. 2018) measures perceived autonomy with 
mobility-related items such as the item ‘robot is able to 
autonomously navigate in space’. Similarly, Schaefer and 
collegues (2018) assess users’ perception of the ARIBO 
driverless shuttle, a vehicle somewhat similar to a golf cart, 
using the question “the vehicle controls itself”, where con-
trol in this case is naturally linked to navigation due to the 
nature of the autonomous vehicle. In addition, Papenmeier 
et al. (2019) have participants assess their mobile robot 
repeatedly in terms of its autonomy. Given that the main dis-
tinguishing features between the different presentations are 
head orientation and the direction of movement of the robot, 
it is to little surprise that also here perceived autonomy is 
tightly linked to features of mobility. Here, autonomy is 
assessed via the single semantic differential ‘pilot-operated’ 
vs. ‘self-propelled’.
Further support for a close relationship between auton-
omy and mobility or movement is provided by Jochum et al. 
(2017). Rather than report experimental results, the authors 
1 Brincker’s notion of affordances is largely based on that of Rietveld 
and Kiverstein (2014), who define them as “relations between aspects 
of a material environment and abilities available in a form of life”. 
‘Form of life’ is a term borrowed from Wittgenstein and is meant to 
emphasise that human action is always executed within specific soci-
ocultural contexts.
2 Not every interaction in human–robot interaction is necessarily 
reciprocal, especially if the robot lacks the capability to assess the 
human’s intentions correctly, hence the additional qualification.
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provide insights into the design of entertainment robots and 
emphasize the importance of keeping a robot constantly ani-
mated if the “illusion of autonomy” is to be maintained for 
the observer.
Support of a broader interpretation of perceived auton-
omy which is tied less tightly to the notion of mobility 
and movement is provided by the person perception scale 
(Rosenthal-von der Pütten et al. 2017). This scale is used 
in the former study to assess participants’ impression of 
a humanoid robot with respect to likability, intelligence, 
and autonomy. Judging by the items that make up the fac-
tor autonomy, the presumed underlying concept is ostensi-
bly more general than is the case in EmCorp, with mobil-
ity not playing a major role. The six items making up the 
factor autonomy in the person perception scale are ‘(not) 
autonomous’, ‘self-dependent’, ‘responsible for its actions’, 
‘restricted in its abilities’, ‘free’, and ‘self-determined’.
In its more broader take on perceived autonomy, the per-
son perception scale is remarkably similar to a construct 
reported in Epley et al. (2008) which was used to assess 
participants’ perceived agency of technical gadgets such as 
a mobile alarm clock or a programmable pillow. To enable 
participants to rate these gadgets in terms of their perceived 
agency Epley and collegues provide them with the items 
‘has a mind of its own’, ‘has intentions’, ‘has free will’, ‘has 
consciousness’, and ‘experiences emotion’. Finally, Kamide 
et al. (2013) provide another construct for perceived agency 
together with eight other factors such as perceptions of util-
ity, familiarity, or repulsion. All nine factors make up the 
PHIT-40 scale that was designed specifically for assessing 
perceptions of humanoid robots. Within PHIT-40, perceived 
agency is calculated based on the two Likert-scale items 
“The robot looks as if it has a heart” and “The robot looks 
as if it has its own will”.
Summarily, and based on the ways in which agency and 
autonomy are assessed within the aforementioned scales, 
we cannot fail to observe that the notion of autonomy 
seems to vary halfways consistently with the nature of 
the to-be-assessed robot. If the robots in question bear a 
resemblance with non-autonomous vehicles such as cars, 
autonomy assessments tend to make reference to mobility 
and the locus of control (self- vs. other-controlled). If the 
robots in question bare more resemblance to the human 
shape, the constructs for assessing perceptions of autonomy 
are wider, and tend to make reference to high-level psycho-
logical constructs such as emotions, intentions, and volition. 
Moreover, this wider version of perceived autonomy bear a 
strong resemblance to equivalent constructs for perceived 
agency. While questionnaires, or self-reports, may be the 
most widely used tools to measure personal attitudes or 
subjective construals of technical artifacts in HRI, there are 
alternative approaches. One such approach is the analysis 
of participants’ speech-in-interaction, which is used in the 
present study and which carries the advantage of “measur-
ing” or indicating such attitudes at the time of the interac-
tion, rather than relying on a posteriori self-assessments. 
However, prior to introducing the methodology, we need to 
introduce the concept of intent interpretations, as they may 
play a central role in linguistic expressions of attributions of 
emotion, volition, or motivation.
1.3  Intent interpretations and attributions 
of agency
The concept of intent interpretations as we use it here, 
originates from research in developmental psychology on 
language acquisition. Pea (1980), attributing the notion to 
(Ryan 1974), and focusing on their import in the context of 
early negation, describes with intent interpretations those 
utterances that adults use to linguistically express non-lin-
guistic acts of rejection by the child. Such acts of rejection 
include headshakes or the throwing away of offered things 
amongst others. However, intent interpretations are meant 
to cover also utterances that “describe” or interpret positive 
expressions of intention produced by a linguistically incom-
petent child. In our previous work, we have adapted the con-
cept of intent interpretations in a analysis of negative robot-
directed speech and defined negative intent interpretations as 
“assertions in which the participant interprets (the robot’s) 
intentional or motivational state utilizing lexical and/or 
grammatical negatives” (Förster 2018). Another important 
property of this type of utterance is that it identifies a child’s 
(or robot’s) motivational state in the here and now and thus 
contrasts with habitual preferences or motivational expres-
sions in the past or future. Intent interpretations are, there-
fore, by definition, temporally tightly linked to co-occurring 
non-linguistic expressions of the target of interpretation.
When viewed as an interpersonal dyadic mechanism—
a linguistically more competent speaker “spells out” a 
less competent speaker’s intentions and feelings in direct 
response to these very bodily expressions—intent interpre-
tations form an interesting contrast to the more established 
joint attentional frames (cf. Tomasello 2003). The latter are 
said to be one of the central mechanisms in human language 
acquisition where a more competent speaker, typically the 
parent, shares attention with the language learner, typically a 
child, with respect to some outside entity (Tomasello 2000). 
In other words, joint attentional frames are a triadic mecha-
nism that necessarily involve a third xentity in addition to 
the two interactors, whereas intent interpretations are dyadic 
mechanisms which may or may not involve some external 
referent. In joint attentional frames the ultimate target of the 
teacher’s utterance, the thing that the utterance is about, lies 
outside of the dyad, whereas intent interpretations are ulti-
mately about the learner’s emotion, motivation, or volition.
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Based on the previous analyses of participants’ nega-
tive speech documented in Förster et al. (2019), the high 
prevalence of negative intent interpretations within that 
that speech, and the link of these utterances to the robot’s 
bodily display of motivation or affect, we believe that 
intent interpretations more generally—positive or negative 
forms—are a highly frequent audible expression of human 
attributions of agency or autonomy to an agent. While we 
also encountered other forms of negative speech that may 
provide similarly strong clues with respect to such attribu-
tions, negative intent interpretations were by far the most 
frequent type of this kind amongst negative utterances. It 
is for this reason that we expect many non-negative utter-
ances deemed to indicate participants’ attributions of moti-
vation, and therefore agency, to fall in this category.
2  Methods
The results presented in this paper are based on a com-
bination of lexical analysis and semantic–pragmatic cat-
egorization of human participants’ speech transcripts. 
Analyzing speech gathered during an interaction between 
humans and robots to gain insights into both the partici-
pants’ perception of the robot and the interaction more 
general is not entirely new (cf. Fischer et al. 2012). While 
in HRI, the use of post-experimental self-reports is more 
frequently used in assessing types of participant attribu-
tions; Fischer and colleagues show that, since participants’ 
linguistic choices correlate with their conceptualization of 
the robot (cf Fischer 2011 and Fischer et al. 2011), they 
can be used to assess the latter.
In the present study, the relevant speech was originally 
gathered during two experiments that targeted the acqui-
sition and grounding of linguistic negation (Förster et al. 
2018, 2019). In addition to these two corpora, we will use 
another corpus of speech transcripts as a baseline which was 
gathered during an experiment that preceded the two nega-
tion experiments (Saunders et al. 2012). The latter focused 
on the robotic acquisition and lexical grounding of object 
labels and of words relating to object attributes such as color 
or size. While details on these experiments are provided in 
the aforementioned publications, we summarize these three 
studies in the next section to sketch the situational context 
within which this material was gathered. The move clarifies 
the overall motivation behind using affective displays for the 
purpose of language acquisition.
While the aforementioned publications from Förster et al. 
focused analytically on negation words, the analysis of the 
present study hones in on emotion and volition words as 
well as words and utterances that indicate attributions of 
autonomy.
2.1  Experiments on the acquisition of negation, 
object labels, and object attributes
The set of experiments constituting the basis for the speech 
corpora used within the following analysis combined meth-
ods from two adjacent and sometimes overlapping fields 
in robotics: developmental (or epigenetic) robotics (Asada 
et al. 2009) and HRI (Dautenhahn 2007). The studies were 
examples of developmental robotics in that many of the 
employed heuristics and the general experimental setup 
were informed by developmental psychology and psycho-
linguistics. The studies were largely human–robot interac-
tion studies not only by virtue of using human–robot dyads 
as a basic experimental building block, but also by insisting 
on the use of naïve participants and unconstrained speech. 
To our knowledge, these experiments are, to date, the only 
studies in robotic language acquisition that utilize uncon-
strained speech as “learning substrate” for the machine-
learning algorithms.
The rejection and prohibition experiments were jointly 
designed to test the hypotheses that the abovementioned 
intent interpretations (Ryan 1974) or paternal prohibitions 
(Spitz 1957), both described in Pea (1980), may form the 
developmental root of linguistic negation. The common 
denominator in both hypotheses is a requirement of affect, 
motivation, or volition. In the case of intent interpretations, 
caretakers—typically the parents—are thought to interpret 
bodily expressions of affect or volition linguistically, thereby 
providing the child with labels for its internal state, so to 
speak (Pea 1980). The mechanism behind Spitz’ hypothesis 
is somewhat more complicated as it requires role reversal, 
but ultimately phrases accompanying (or embodying) paren-
tal forms or prohibition are thought to be the origin for the 
first negation words (Spitz 1957). Prohibition involves strong 
affect or motivation on both sides: the child must want some 
forbidden object or act, and act accordingly, whereas the 
parent must want to prevent the child from reaching or com-
mitting whatever is the object of its desire.
We, therefore, integrated a motivation module into an 
existing cognitive architecture and designed facial expres-
sions and affectively congruent behaviors for positive, 
negative, and neutral motivation. The motivation would be 
triggered by randomly assigned object valences such that 
it appeared to the observer that the robot likes, dislikes, or 
“feels” neutral about the presented objects.
In terms of the experimental setup, participants were 
asked in all three experiments to act as language tutors for 
the child-like humanoid robot Deechee, an iCub robot (Metta 
et al. 2008). The majority of participants were recruited from 
the university campus and included members of staff and 
Ph.D. students from neighboring labs. None of the partici-
pants were roboticists and, in the negation experiment, all 
were naïve in the sense that they were not informed that the 
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topic under investigation was linguistic negation. Instead we 
adopted the participants instructions from Saunders’ et al. 
(2012) experiment by telling them the more general story 
that they were acting as language tutors for the robot, and 
that they were ought to teach it the names of the shapes on 
the present boxes (cf. Fig. 1).
Deechee is an approximately 1.2-m-tall humanoid robot 
with 53 degrees-of-freedom and a range of sensors including 
visual (two cameras), auditory, haptic, proprioceptive, and 
torque sensors. Applications to control the robot are typi-
cally developed on top of the YARP middleware (Metta et al. 
2006), and there exist a good number of software modules 
developed within a series of EU projects including modules 
to solve inverse kinematics, impedance control, amongst 
other, to allow for the design of robot behaviour at a rela-
tively high level of abstraction.
In terms of the spatial layout, participants and robot were 
seated opposite each other with a table and labeled objects 
between them (cf. Fig. 1). Each participant was told that 
their role would be that of a language teacher for Deechee, 
and that they should teach it the names of the objects located 
between them. To increase the likelihood of participants 
engaging in a speech register akin to child-directed speech 
(CDS, Foulkes et al. 2005), we told them that they should 
imagine the robot to be a 2-year-old child. The lack of accu-
racy of speech recognition at the time required offline tran-
scriptions of participants’ speech. The prosody recognition, 
word extraction, and symbol grounding were performed 
offline as well. This meant that the teaching had to be bro-
ken up into sessions where the robot would learn, i.e. having 
its grounded vocabulary constructed based on participants’ 
speech, in between these sessions.
Prosody recognition was used for the identification and 
extraction of prosodically salient words and involved the 
detection and measurement of pitch, energy, and duration 
for each word (see Saunders et al. 2011 for details).
Symbol grounding in the robotic context refers to the 
(technical) association or linking of symbols such as words 
or other linguistic units with non-symbolic data, typically 
data derived from the robot’s own embodiment such as 
sensorimotor data or, in our case, data originating from a 
motivation-related subsystem (cf. Harnad 1990).
All three experiments consisted of five sessions per 
participant, but the session length in the negation experi-
ments was approximately twice that of the session length 
in Saunders’ experiment—5 and 2.5 min, respectively.
The differing session lengths necessitate a normaliza-
tion of count data to allow for a comparison between the 
experiments. It is for this reason that we report normalized 
attribution counts and attributions per minute, in addition 
to the total counts in Sect. 2.
2.2  Lexical and semantic–pragmatic analyses
To extract all attributions of emotion, volition, and auton-
omy, the analysis proceeded according to the following 
steps:
Step 1: Merging of the three corpora into a single cor-
pus and compilation of a global word list.
Step 2: Selection of words that could potentially be part 
of an attribution of emotion, volition or autonomy, and 
creation of a word list from this selection.
Fig. 1  Spatial layout and robot 
behaviors. Top left: watching 
or neutral behavior. Top right: 
rejective behavior triggered by 
objects with negative valence. 
Bottom left: physical restraint of 
the robots arm triggers negative 
affect. Bottom right: grasping/
approaching behavior triggered 
by objects with positive valence. 
Top left and bottom photos are 
courtesy of Pete Stevens
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Step 3: Extraction of those utterances from the prosodic 
labeling files that contain at least one word of the list cre-
ated in step 2.
Step 4: Categorical annotation or deletion of the utter-
ances coming out of step 3. Deleted were those utterances 
that were not deemed to be attributions of one of the three 
types. All remaining utterances were categorized to be either 
attributions of emotion, attributions of volition, or attribu-
tions of autonomy.
Step 5: Categorization of utterances according to the tar-
get of attribution. Targets of attribution are either ‘robot’, 
‘participant’ (= self), or ‘interpersonal’.
Step 6: Selection of utterances whose attribution target is 
either ‘robot’ or ‘interpersonal’, and calculation of statistics 
based on this utterance set.
While steps 1, 3, and 6, should be self-explanatory, the 
steps 2, 4, and 5, need some more clarification.
In step 2, we selected all words that could potentially 
be part of one of the aforementioned types of attributions. 
Examples for emotion words are “sad”, “happy”, or “hate”, 
examples for references to emotional expressions were 
“smile” or “frown”. Typical words indicating the attribu-
tion of volition are “like” or “want”. Somewhat more general 
is the list of words considered for attributions of autonomy: 
we included words that refer to the assumed presence of 
a metabolism (“hungry”, “eat”), or allowing that a target’s 
bodily functions could be impaired or its livelihood endan-
gered (“hurt”, “sick”, “ill”, etc.). In our view, the bounda-
ries between the three categories—emotions, volition, 
autonomy—are not sharp, and there are several examples 
where a word could fall in either of these categories. Gener-
ally speaking, we tended to interpret attributions of emo-
tion or volition as triggered by an indication in the here and 
now. Attributions of autonomy, on the other hand, could 
also refer to state of affairs in the past, the future, or be 
expressions of general preferences. Attributions involving 
the word “favourite”, for example, were allotted to both the 
categories of attributions of volition as well as attributions 
of autonomy. With “favourite”, the concrete choice of cat-
egory hinged on our judgement whether the attribution was 
triggered by some behaviour on part of Deechee such as a 
frown or smile that just preceded the utterance, or whether 
it was a more general statement of preference that seemed 
more detached for the present situation. The outcome of the 
word selection is shown in Table 1.
For step 4, the same remarks hold as were just made for 
step 2. The categorization according to the three categories 
is certainly not sharp, so the precise numbers have to be 
regarded with a healthy amount of scepticism. However, we 
are in no doubt, that the selected utterances do make refer-
ence to at least one of the respective concepts and do express 
attributions of at least one the three kinds.
Step 5, the determination of the target of attribution is 
also not as trivial as it might seem. When participants use 
utterances such as “we don’t like the squares today”, it could 
be either an interpersonal attribution, expressing that the 
participant genuinely shares Deechee’s sentiment about the 
square. However, it might also be some inverted form of the 
royal ‘we’ in which it is meant to refer to Deechee exclu-
sively. In this case, the participant, fully aware of Deechee’s 
Table 1  Attribution words, 
word frequencies, and 
attribution categories
The following words were extracted from a complete list of words from participants’ transcripts of all three 
experiments. They formed the basis for extracting potential attributions of emotion (emo), volition (vol), or 
autonomy (aut) from the transcripts. The attribution categories were added post hoc, that is, once the utter-
ances containing the stated words had been so classified
Word Cat # Word Cat # Word Cat # Word Cat #
like vol 902 boring aut 1 indifferent vol 2 glum emo 1
want vol 399 horrible emo 4 nasty vol 2 heart aut 1
happy emo 38 love emo 4 play aut 2 hungry aut 1
sad emo 31 smiley emo 4 unhappy emo 2 interest vol 1
smile emo 19 wake aut 4 worry emo 2 liking vol 1
favourite vol 15 enjoy aut 3 ambivalent vol 1 loved emo 1
play vol 15 enjoyed emo 3 argue aut 1 loved vol 1
think aut 10 funny emo 3 argumentative aut 1 miserable emo 1
feel aut 9 grumpy emo 3 depressed emo 1 mood emo 1
keen vol 9 interested aut 3 despised emo 1 nice emo 1
hate emo 8 love vol 3 excited emo 1 sorry emo 1
interested vol 7 tired emo 3 fond vol 1 teasing aut 1
bored emo 5 blood aut 2 friendly aut 1 terribly vol 1
bored vol 1 dislike vol 2 frowny emo 1 understand aut 1
favorite aut 5 feeling emo 2 fun emo 1 upset aut 1
boring emo 4 hurt aut 2 fussy aut 1
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severe limitations with regard to the capacity to express 
itself, may genuinely adopt the role of Deechee and speaks 
in its stead, so to speak.
3  Results
Section 3.1 lists and summarizes the tables with the abso-
lute and relative counts of all those utterances produced by 
the participants that indicate that they did attribute volition, 
emotion, or agency more generally to Deechee, the robot. 
For the sake of brevity, we will in the following flatten the 
distinction between utterance and attribution and use the 
word ‘attribution’ for ‘utterance that indicates attribution’, 
and hope that this imprecision is transparent enough.
Section 3.2 lists three transcripts that provide some exem-
plary context in which such utterances were produced, and 
two additional transcripts that capture some of the more 
remarkable moments in the experiments. Transcript 4 cap-
tures aspect of a situation where a participant gets into an 
argument with Deechee because of its uttering “no”, tran-
script 5 shows how even a speech-wise very disciplined par-
ticipant who adhered to self-imposed restrictions in terms 
of his speech sometimes lapses in terms of these restrictions 
and makes reference to Deechee’s preferences, indicating 
attribution of volition or intent.
3.1  Linguistic attributions of emotion, volition, 
and autonomy more generally within the three 
experiments
Table 2 lists the absolute and relative number of each attri-
bution type and for each participant of the three experiments. 
As mentioned above, the important data for the purpose of 
Table 2  Total and relative 
numbers of attributions 
of emotion, volition, and 
autonomy per participant for 
the rejection experiment (R1–
R10), prohibition experiment 
(P1–P10), and baseline 
(= Saunders’ experiment, B1–
B9), accumulated across all five 
sessions
Counted were only attributions to the robot and interpersonal attributions
PID participant ID, apm attributions per minute
PID # Attribution of 
emotion
apm # Attributions of 
volition
apm # Attributions of 
autonomy
apm
R1 0 0 3 0.12 0 0
R2 0 0 57 2.99 4 0.21
R3 14 0.63 96 4.30 1 0.04
R4 26 1.10 126 5.34 0 0
R5 12 0.45 146 5.43 0 0
R6 2 0.08 118 4.84 1 0.04
R7 21 0.84 95 3.79 3 0.12
R8 0 0 3 0.13 0 0
R9 5 0.20 44 1.74 4 0.16
R10 0 0 20 0.79 0 0
P1 1 0.04 34 1.33 0 0
P2 0 0 19 0.69 0 0
P3 5 0.20 150 5.93 2 0.08
P4 17 0.64 98 3.67 5 0.19
P5 1 0.04 52 2.06 0 0
P6 29 1.15 70 2.77 9 0.36
P7 8 0.31 50 1.94 3 0.12
P8 3 0.12 57 2.27 2 0.08
P9 1 0.04 60 2.28 0 0
P10 1 0.04 18 0.69 12 0.46
B1 0 0 0 0 0 0
B2 0 0 0 0 0 0
B3 0 0 0 0 0 0
B4 0 0 0 0 0 0
B5 0 0 0 0 0 0
B6 0 0 0 0 0 0
B7 0 0 0 0 0 0
B8 2 0.17 36 3.06 5 0.42
B9 0 0 11 1.06 0 0
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comparison are the attributions per minute (apm), rather 
than the absolute number of attributions because the ses-
sions of the negation experiments were approximately twice 
as long as the sessions in Saunders’ et al. (2012) experiment. 
The measure of attributions per minute thus effectively fac-
tors duration out of account.
Table 3 lists the accumulated number of attributions, 
both apm and absolute numbers, for all three types and 
experiments.
As shown in Table 3, the average number of attributions 
per minute in the two negation experiments was considerably 
higher than in the baseline. In the rejection and prohibition 
experiments, the “average participant” produced nearly six 
and five times as many attributions of one of the three types 
as compared to the baseline, respectively. Attributions of 
volition outstrip attributions of emotion and attributions of 
agency by far in all three experiments. However, as Table 2 
shows the accumulation of numbers across participants hides 
an important detail.
Rows B1–B9 of Table 2 clearly show that the production 
of relevant utterances was by no means evenly distributed 
across participants. Whereas participants B1–B7 produced 
no attributions of the relevant kind at all, B8 produced attri-
butions of volition whose frequency was comparable to 
the average of the distribution in the negation experiments 
(cf. participants R10 or P10). Therefore, even though par-
ticipants’ speech was clearly impacted by Deechee’s overt 
displays of emotion and volition, there is still considerable 
variability across participants. R1, for example, constitut-
ing the “lower limit” in terms of the number of attributions, 
only produced three such attributions across all five sessions, 
whereas participants such as R5 or P3 went “all out” and 
produced literally hundreds within a time frame of approxi-
mately 25 min without ever having prompted by the experi-
menters to do so.
The extremely skewed distribution in the baseline indi-
cates that for most participants the attribution of emotion, 
volition, and autonomy seems to follow an “all or nothing” 
mechanism: either they do not produce any utterances of 
this kind, as is the case for B1–B7, or they produce a good 
number of them on par with participants where the robot 
displays emotions and preferences overtly. Participants such 
as R1 or R8, who produce only a very small number of such 
attributions are seen as exceptions.
3.2  Exemplary transcripts of attributions in context
To give a better impression of the conversational context in 
which the different attributions occurred, we provide several 
transcripts. Transcripts 1–3 are examples of the three types 
of attributions that we encountered during the experiments.
Transcript 1 illustrates the use of ‘like’, in this case 
negated, which we took to be an attribution of volition. It is 
the most frequently used word within this type of attribution 
(cf. Table 1), only followed by ‘want’. From past research, 
we know that ‘like’ belongs to the prosodically most salient 
words linked to affect or motivation in the given experimen-
tal scenarios (cf Förster et al. 2019), and we see examples of 
this in the lines 5 and 11 of the transcript. As a consequence, 
‘like’ frequently ended up in Deechee’s active vocabulary 
and was produced by it in follow-up sessions.
Transcript 1: Attribution of volition. Participant R2, ses-
sion 1, 25 s into the session. Prosodically salient words are 
in italic. Lines 5 and 11 show attributions of volition involv-
ing the word ‘like’. Line 2 and 10 show negative intent inter-
pretations expressed with ‘no’. Capitalized words indicate 
the attribution of volition or motivation.
 1. that triangle
 2. NO
 3. what about this
 4. this heart sign
 5. no, you don’t LIKE
 6. that one
 7. what about
 8. squares
 9. NOT the squares
 10. NO
 11. you DON’T LIKE it
 12. put that down
Transcript 2 illustrates the production of an attribution of 
a very strong emotion—hate (line 14). This was produced by 
participant R7 rather jokingly in this session, and R7 made 
produced lots of emotion attributions in this session, not 
merely “lexicalizing” Deechee’s display of preferences but 
exaggerating them.
Transcript 2: Attribution of emotion. Participant R7, ses-
sion 4, 4 min 37 s into session. Prosodically salient words 
are marked in italic, there are no prosodically marked words 
in lines 12–14, as the prosodic marking output is missing 
for these last few lines, probably as only the first 5 min of 
speech were considered for such marking, and these three 
Table 3  Relative and total numbers of attributions of emotion, voli-
tion, and autonomy
Numbers are average attributions per minute (apm) across all partici-
pants of the respective experiment
Numbers in brackets: total sum of attributions of the respective cat-
egory
Rejection Exp Prohibition Exp Baseline
Emotion attributions 0.33 (80) 0.25 (66) 0.02 (2)
Volition attributions 2.95 (708) 2.35 (608) 0.50 (47)
Autonomy attributions 0.05 (13) 0.13 (33) 0.05 (5)
Total 3.34 (801) 2.73 (707) 0.57 (54)
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utterances are just beyond the 5-min mark. Lines 13 and 
14 show strong attributions of emotion. Capitalized words 
indicate the attribution of motivation, volition, or emotion.
 1. yeah, the target
 2. oh
 3. you seem very INDIFFERENT
 4. to it actually
 5. but maybe INDIFFERENT
 6. is too big a word for you at the moment
 7. so, it’s your FAVORITE
 8. is this your FAVORITE
 9. yes, your FAVORITE
 10. and
 11. you’re
 12. LEAST FAVORITE your
 13. DESPISED you HATE the triangle
 14. HATE HATE the triangle
Transcript 3 provides an example of the attribution of 
autonomy, the least frequent type of attribution. In line 4, 
participant P6 uses the word ‘hurt’ with respect to Deechee, 
indicating that it comes across as a being that could experi-
ence bodily harm. She could have used the word ‘damage’ 
here, which has a somewhat more mechanistic connotation, 
but chose the word ‘hurt’ instead. As mentioned in Sect. 0, 
and in line with more enactive interpretations of autonomy 
and agency (Brincker, 2016), we take references to bodily 
integrity and metabolism to be indicators of attribution of 
autonomy.
Transcript 3: Attribution of autonomy. Participant P6, 
session 2, 25 s into session. Prosodically salient words are 
marked in italic. ‘Hurt’ in line 6 was classified as attribution 
of autonomy as it makes reference to corporal health, the 
capacity to be hurt. From this line alone, one could not be 
sure whether it was indeed attributed to the robot or not, but 
on a later occasion in this session P6 uses ‘hurt’ again, and 
at that time uses ‘you’ as subject of that utterance. Capital-
ized words indicate attributions of motivation or attributions 
of autonomy more generally.
 1. let me show you another
 2. this one
 3. this is the triangle
 4. this shape this is quite a sharp
 5. shape
 6. could HURT you if you put your hands on all sides
 7. it has three equal sides
 8. this triangle
 9. on this one
 10. there are three
 11. two black
 12. one white
 13. this one you’re NOT VERY INTERESTED
 14. IN are you
Transcripts 4 illustrates the “conversational power” of 
the combination of emotional displays with volition-indi-
cating body behaviors which, in conjunction with the robot 
using the word ‘no’ itself, trigger an argument between 
participant R2 and Deechee. Deechee, which is “inaudi-
ble” in the transcript, keeps on saying ‘circle’ and ‘no’ 
repeatedly. Since ‘no’ was uttered just at the right time, R2 
takes this as truth-functional denial, that is, that what he 
just said about the moon was wrong, and that it’s actually 
called a circle. In lines 8 and 9, R2 gives a hint that he is 
aware of the ambiguity of the single-word utterance ‘no’: 
here, it could both mean truth-functional denial or, alter-
natively, be a case of motivation-dependent rejection of 
the object as a whole. R2, possibly due to the accidentally 
correct timing of the ‘no’ on part of Deechee, goes with 
interpretation 1 and berates Deechee for correcting him.
Transcript 4: “The argument”. Participant R2, session 
3, 3 min 59 s into session. Prosodically salient words are 
marked in italic. Some utterances are not marked as pro-
sodically salient as the prosodic marking algorithm was 
slightly different with the very first participants and not 
every utterance “generated” a prosodically salient word. 
Capitalized words indicate attributions of motivation or 
volition, or attribution of autonomy more generally.
 1. no, ok
 2. yes, you’re Deechee
 3. ok, I put that
 4. down
 5. ahm, and
 6. ok what about
 7. the moon the crescent there
 8. no, you DON’T LIKE that one
 9. circles that’s not a circle no, you DON’T LIKE it but 
it’s not a circle
 10. it’s a crescent that
 11. or a moon
 12. if you’d rather
 13. no
 14. it’s not a circle I can tell you that
 15. it’s not circles
 16. DON’T ARGUE with me Deechee
 17. ah that’s a moon that is
 18. ah no it’s not circles
 19. no
 20. TRY TO BE ARGUMENTATIVE Deechee
 21. no
 22. it’s not circles
 AI & SOCIETY
1 3
Transcript 5 illustrates the difficulty of participants in 
refraining from making reference to the perceived intent or 
volition of the addressee. It also illustrates the conversational 
power of `no’. Participant P2 is a special case in that he 
changed his robot-directed speech dramatically between ses-
sions 2 and 3. Via a personal contact, we were made aware 
that P2 had decided to optimize the learning progress of the 
robot by constraining his speech behavior in rather extreme 
ways. While he was still speaking more or less like other 
participants during the first two sessions, he only used a 
very small set of utterance types from session 3 onwards. 
By and large, he would then only provide object labels and 
give positive or negative feedback once the robot had uttered 
something, but not engage in any “chit chat” that, in his 
view, seemed to have no direct bearing on the learning task. 
As this violated our experimental instructions—to speak to 
the robot as if it was a 2-year-old child—we excluded his 
data in some strands of our analysis (cf. Förster et al., 2019). 
Nonetheless informative for the present analysis are those 
occasions where P2 slipped in terms of his self-imposed 
restrictions, and where he did engage in types of speech 
other than the mere provision of object labels or positive or 
negative feedback.
Transcript 5: “Loss of composure”: R10, session 5, 1 min 
20 s. Prosodically salient words are marked in italic. Viola-
tions of R10’s self-imposed speech restrictions—labelling 
and feedback—can be seen in lines 5, 10, and 16. Capital-
ized words indicate attributions of volition.
 1. no, don’t say done
 2. yeah, triangle
 3. well done
 4. no, I say well done
 5. you don’t say done
 6. what’s this one? Yes
 7. a heart
 8. yea
 9. crescent, well done
 10. stop saying no
 11. circle
 12. no square, yeah square
 13. well done
 14. yeah
 15. triangle
 16. do you WANT it? NO
 17. YES
 18. YEAH
While his slips in lines 5 and 10 could still be inter-
preted as being within his self-imposed restrictions, they 
are negatively reinforcing utterances about Deechee’s speech 
after all, this is certainly not the case in line 16. Here, R10 
felt compelled to make reference to Deechee’s perceived 
volition. On several occasions, Deechee appeared unde-
cided with respect to his preferences. Due to Deechee’s 
object detection working less than perfectly well at times, 
Deechee’s may have perceived the presented object as two 
objects between which his perception may have switched 
rapidly. If these two perceived objects happened to have 
opposite valences, approach and rejection behaviors would 
be triggered in rapid succession of each other. This could be 
interpreted as undecided behavior by a naïve observer. Yet, 
no one forced R10 to make reference to this behavior in his 
robot-directed speech, and such referencing seemed outside 
of his self-imposed limits if we compare it to the majority 
of his utterances. It is, therefore, interesting to observe that, 
if R10 showed any such lapses, they were typically lapses 
towards the attribution or referencing of volition.
4  Discussion
The results corroborate the anecdotal findings. If we assume 
that the participants express what they felt, they can be said 
to engage in a multitude of attributions of emotions, volition, 
and autonomy. The number of indications of such attribu-
tions in participants’ speech in the negation experiments was 
four times more frequent than those in participants’ speech 
from the “affect-less” baseline scenario. The concrete forms 
of attributions seem to be triggered in the here and now and 
thus appear to be identical to what Pea (1980), with refer-
ence to (Ryan 1974), termed intent interpretations. However, 
a deeper analysis involving a temporal alignment between 
the robot’s emotional expressions and participants’ speech 
is required to confirm the tight temporal coupling required 
for such a categorization.
While this may not seem surprising in view of the robot’s 
overt affective or motivated behavior, it should be empha-
sized that these utterances are not mere detached and incon-
sequential comments referencing the robot’s motivated 
behavior. Intent interpretations are tightly coupled with par-
ticular enactments of its behavior and appear to contribute 
to the determination of the next move in the interaction. The 
majority of attributions were attributions of volition that, fol-
lowing our categorization, are directly linked to or triggered 
by the robot’s expressions and behavior.
But what role do these attributions or interpretations play 
in the conversation? Why do participants engage in them? 
While we cannot say for sure why humans engage in these 
attributions, and while the issue is, to our knowledge, undoc-
umented in the developmental psychological literature, we 
offer a speculation.
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We hypothesize that such “outspoken” attributions form 
part of a type of negotiation processes3 whose purpose is the 
alignment of the two interactors’ wills and emotions, and 
the joint determination of the next move in the interaction 
(cf. Cowley 2005). Within our simple learning scenario, the 
next move will nearly always consist of the choice of the 
next object to talk about. Participants, by overtly and audibly 
attributing the robot’s intent, provide it with a near-optimal 
slot for “having its say”, or for slotting in its contribution.
Imagine a situation where Deechee would have the capac-
ity to express its “feelings” or attitudes in a more verbose 
manner. Participants’ attributions, especially attributions of 
volition, would afford Deechee with an occasion to “jump 
in” and correct the participant’s interpretation of its own 
will, if Deechee wanted to change the course of action. 
It appears that those participants that engage in them, by 
offering up their interpretations of the robot’s intent audibly, 
provide the robot with a conversational scaffold to take its 
turn in the joint negotiation, once it has the capacity to do 
so (see, for example, transcript 4, lines 6–9, or transcript 5, 
lines 16–18).
It is unclear to us as to whether the tight temporal cou-
pling of intent interpretations with the corresponding moti-
vation-indicating body behaviors is a feature specific to 
conversationally asymmetric speakers such as parent and 
child, or tutor and robot, or whether it can be more widely 
observed. Although underplayed in accounts on language 
acquisition centered around joint attentional frames, the tight 
temporal relationship between what is attentionally picked 
out and its “linguistic label” appears to be of some impor-
tance. In interactive machine learning, focusing on language 
or speech such couplings have to the best of our knowledge 
been ignored in the past.
The above findings of audible attributions of autonomy in 
their various forms are in line with our findings with respect 
to negation words, particularly ‘no’. In addition, there, the 
production of negative utterances skyrocketed once the robot 
displayed emotion, volition, or intent. Many of the negative 
utterances could be interpreted as attributions of volition 
akin to the ones we found in the current study. The main 
difference here is that negation words such as ‘no’ typically 
do not have standard semantic meaning that could be easily 
mapped to emotion, volition, or autonomy more generally. 
However, on the pragmatic level, many of the utterances 
appear to fulfill the same purpose—to guide the joint action 
of the dyad and to align each other’s preferences. Whether 
a participant utters “that’s a sad face” and puts the object 
down, or whether she says “no, you don’t like it” and puts 
it down, does pragmatically not really make a difference, 
even though the semantics of ‘no’ and ‘sad’ appear to differ 
considerably.
In terms of language acquisition, and following Pea’s sug-
gestion (Pea 1980), our study provides further evidence for 
the hypothesis that intent interpretations may lie at the root 
of children’s first negation words as well as being the root 
of the first words for expressing emotion or volition. Both 
negation and emotion or motivation-related words such as 
“like” are often prosodically salient in the tutor’s speech, as 
we have already documented in Förster et al. (2019). Under 
our operationalization in the robotic architecture, this means 
that these words are extracted, grounded in sensorimotor-
motivational data, and propagated into the robots active 
vocabulary.
Notably, many of these words also belong to the earliest 
vocabularies of human toddlers (cf. Fenson et al. 1994).
Nevertheless, a deeper analysis is required to determine 
and quantify the precise temporal relationships between 
the robot’s bodily expressions and participant’s linguistic 
interpretation or attribution thereof, as issues of timing are 
likely to have a considerable impact in terms of the robot’s 
learning success.
5  Future work
The present analysis is only the first step in a planned series 
of analyses of emotional and volitional robot-directed speech 
as collected during the two negation experiments. Akin to 
the multi-layered analysis that we performed in the work 
reported there, we would like to analyze the presented 
attributive or interpretive utterances more deeply around a 
conversation analytical transcription of parts of the inter-
action. Further, an independent part will consist of a tem-
poral analysis investigating the precise temporal alignment 
between the robot’s emotional and behavioral expression and 
participants’ attributive utterances.
Independent of the work on language acquisition is the 
question in how far emotional and volition-indicating expres-
sions could or should be used to synchronize human–robot 
joint actions in more applied scenarios such as object hando-
vers which the authors are currently working on.
A major difference between our language teaching or 
tutoring setup and more applied scenarios where humans 
do not act as teacher is the presence or absence of some 
form of interactional symmetry. Teaching or tutoring 
setups are characterized by a marked difference in the 
3 Using the term ‘negotiation’, we do not mean to imply this to be a 
conscious decision on part of the human or a construal of the  robot 
as entity that is genuinely capable of engaging in full-blown negotia-
tions. A good part of the observed patterned and interpersonal behav-
ior might be largely subconscious. Therefore, the “decision” to offer 
the robot a slot for “having its say” may not be a conscious decision 
at all but rather a form of ingrained interaction pattern, on the level 
of conversational turns. If this is the case, it may take more conscious 
effort to not engage in this type of behavior than just to “go with the 
flow”.
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relevant skill set between human and robot, and the human 
teacher seems to take a role of both higher responsibility 
and also of higher power. In this sense, the two interact-
ants are not equals in such setups and there is a marked 
asymmetry between them. It is unclear whether humans 
in more symmetrical human–robot setups would engage 
in linguistic attributions of autonomy to the same degree, 
as those in our experiments, thereby offering the robot a 
slot to “have its say”.
6  Conclusions
Originating from a set of human–robot interaction experi-
ments, we have documented major differences in partici-
pants’ speech which were apparently trigged by the robot’s 
emotional expressions and congruent body behaviors. The 
relevant changes in their speech indicated that these partici-
pants attributed emotion, volition, or autonomy more gener-
ally to the robot as compared to a “non-affective” baseline 
scenario. However, we also found that 2 out of 9 participants 
in the baseline scenario produced similar utterances indicat-
ing that such attributions were not strictly dependent on an 
overtly “affective stance” on part of the machine.
Numerically, the three attribution types were dominated 
by attributions of volition, the majority of which involved 
the words ‘like’ or ‘want’.
We hypothesize that those forms of attribution that are 
triggered by behaviors in the here and now, namely attri-
butions of emotion and volition in our classification, are 
by and large identical to what Joanna Ryan referred to as 
intent interpretations. Being unaware of any research into 
the function of these utterances, we hypothesize that they 
are meant to afford the linguistically less competent learner 
a scaffold to contribute and clarify their stance in the nego-
tiation of an ongoing joint action. It is unclear whether such 
scaffolding is restricted to competence-wise asymmetrical 
dyads, where the more competent interactant offers the less 
competent interactant a hand, or whether we also find such 
conversational scaffolds in the negotiation processes of more 
symmetrical setups.
Our observation hints towards the possibility that 
such attributions may be necessary in certain forms of 
human–robot joints action. It is, however, not clear how such 
“low-level” conversational attributions relate to the “deeper” 
unidirectional attributions of emotions towards robots that 
have been mentioned by Scheutz (2011). While the latter 
could pose a danger for our collective psyche by robots dis-
tracting humans from healthy human–human relations and 
monopolizing their users’ attention and care, the former 
might be necessary to get certain forms of joint actions done.
Funding The experiments from which the corpora under analysis 
in this paper originate were supported by the EU Integrated Project 
ITALK (“Integration and Transfer of Action and Language in Robots”) 
funded by the European Commission under contract number FP-7-
214668. The analysis presented in the current paper was supported by 
The Turing Institute and within the project ‘Learning collaboration 
affordances for intuitive human–robot interaction’. The Turing pro-
vides its partners with funding for activities that enhance the research 
development more generally among data and AI researchers, enhance 
the Turing Fellow community and enhances existing Turing Fellow-
ship projects.
Data availability The corpus of transcripts originating from the rejec-
tion experiment has been made publicly available here: https ://doi.
org/10.18745 /DS.18196 . Some exemplary videos of the human–robot 
interaction in the negation experiments can be found here: https ://doi.
org/10.18745 /pb.21637 .
Compliance with ethical standards 
Conflict of interest The authors do not declare any conflicts of interest.
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attri-
bution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adapta-
tion, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long 
as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, 
provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes 
were made. The images or other third party material in this article are 
included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated 
otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in 
the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not 
permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will 
need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a 
copy of this licence, visit http://creat iveco mmons .org/licen ses/by/4.0/.
References
Asada M et al (2009) cognitive developmental robotics: a survey. IEEE 
Trans Auton Ment Dev 1(1):12–34
Briggs G, Scheutz M (2014) How robots can affect human behavior: 
investigating the effects of robotic displays of protest and distress. 
Int J Soc Robot 6(3):343–355
Brincker M (2016) Dynamics of perceptible agency: the case of social 
robots. Mind Mach 26(4):441–466
Buss S (2002) Personal autonomy. The Standford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy
Carlson Z et al (2019) Perceived mistreatment and emotional capability 
following aggressive treatment of robots and computers. Int J Soc 
Robot 11:727–739
Cowley SJ (2005) Languaging: how babies and bonobos lock on to 
human modes of life. Int J Comput Cogn 3(1):44–55
Dautenhahn K (2007) Socially intelligent robots: dimensions of human-
robot interaction. Philos Trans R Soc B 362(1480):679–704
Epley N, Akalis S, Waytz A, Cacioppo JT (2008) Creating social 
connection through inferential reproduction: loneliness and per-
ceived agency in gadgets, gods, and greyhounds. Psychol Sci 
19(2):114–120
Fenson L et al (1994) Variability in early communicative development. 
Monogr Soc Res Child Dev 59(5):i–185
AI & SOCIETY 
1 3
Ferrari F, Paladino MP, Jetten J (2016) Blurring human-machine dis-
tinctions: anthropomorphic appearance in social robots as a threat 
to human distinctiveness. Int J Soc Robot 8(2):287–302
Fischer K (2011) Interpersonal variation in understanding robots as 
social actors. s.l., IEEE, pp. 53–60
Fischer K, Foth K, Rohlfing K, Wrede B (2011) Mindful tutors: lin-
guistic choice and action demonstration in speech to infants and 
a simulated robot. Int Stud 12(1):134–161
Fischer K, Lohan K, Foth K (2012) Levels of embodiment: linguistic 
analyses of factors influencing HRI. Boston, IEEE, pp. 463-470
Förster F (2018) Coding scheme for negative utterances. University of 
Hertfordshire, Hatfield
Förster F, Saunders J, Nehaniv CL (2018) Robots that say “no” Affec-
tive symbol grounding and the case of intent interpretations. IEEE 
Trans Cogn Dev Syst 10(3):530–544
Förster F, Saunders J, Lehmann H, Nehaniv CL (2019) Robots learning 
to say “no”: prohibition and rejective mechanisms in acquisition 
of linguistic negation. ACM Trans Hum Robot Interact 8(4):26
Foulkes P, Docherty G, Watt D (2005) Phonological variation in child-
directed speech. Language 81(1):177–206
Gahrn-Andersen R (2020) Seeming autonomy, technology and the 
uncanny valley. AI & Soc. https ://doi.org/10.1007/s0014 6-020-
01040 -9
Geiskkovitch DY, Cormier D, Seo SH, Young JE (2016) Please con-
tinue, we need more data: an exploration of obedience to robots. 
J Hum Robot Interact 5(1):82–99
Harbers M, Peeters MM, Neerincx MA (2017) Perceived autonomy of 
robots: effects of appearance and context. A World with Robots, 
pp. 19–33
Harnad S (1990) The symbol grounding problem. Phys D 
42(1–3):335–346
Hoffmann L, Bock N, Rosenthal vd Pütten AM (2018) The peculiarities 
of robot embodiment (EmCorp-Scale): development, validation 
and initial test of the embodiment and corporeality of artificial 
agents scale. Chicago, USA, Association for Computing Machin-
ery, pp. 370–378
Jochum E, Millar P, Nuñez D (2017) Sequence and chance: design 
and control methods for entertainment robots. Robot Auton Syst 
87:372–380
Kamide H, Kawabe K, Shigemi S, Arai T (2013) Development of a 
psychological scale for general impressions of humanoid. Adv 
Robot 27(1):3–17
Levinson SC (1995) Interactional biases in human thinking. In: Goody 
EN (ed) Social intelligence and interaction. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, pp 221–260
Levinson SC (2006) On the human “interaction engine.” roots of 
human sociality: culture, cognition, and interaction. Berg Pub-
lishers, Oxford, pp 39–69
Metta G, Fitzpatrick P, Natale L (2006) YARP: yet another robot plat-
form. Int J Adv Rob Syst 3(1):8
Metta G et al (2008) The iCub humanoid robot: an open platform for 
research in embodied cognition. Gaithersburg, USA
Papenmeier F, Uhrig M, Kirsch A (2019) Human understanding of 
robot motion: the role of velocity and orientation. Int J Soc Robot 
11(1):75–88
Pea RD (1980) The development of negation in early child language. 
The social foundations of language & thought: essays in honor of 
jerome bruner. W. W. Norton, New York, pp 156–186
Rietveld E, Kiverstein J (2014) A rich landscape of affordances. Ecol 
Psychol 26(4):325–352
Rosenthal-von der Pütten AM, Bock N, Brockmann K (2017) Not 
Your Cup of Tea? How Interacting With a Robot Can Increase 
Perceived Self-efficacy in HRI and Evaluation. Vienna, IEEE, 
pp. 483–492
Ryan J (1974) Early language development: towards a communica-
tional analysis. In: The integration of a child into a social world. 
Cambridge University Press, London
Saunders J, Lehmann H, Sato Y, Nehaniv CL (2011) Towards Using 
Prosody to Scaffold Lexical Meaning in Robots. Frankfurt am 
Main, IEEE, pp. 1–7
Saunders J, Lehmann H, Förster F, Nehaniv CL (2012) Robot acquisi-
tion of lexical meaning—moving towards the two-word stage. San 
Diego, IEEE, pp. 1–7
Schaefer KE, Foots AN, Straub ER (2018) Applied robotics for instal-
lations and base operations: user perceptions of a driverless vehi-
cle at fort bragg. Technical Report: ARL-TR-8265. US Army 
Research Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland
Scheutz M (2011) The inherent dangers of unidirectional emotional 
bonds between humans and social robots. In: Lin P, Abney K, 
Bekey GA (eds) Robot ethics: the ethical and social implications 
of robots. MIT Press, pp 205–221
Spitz RA (1957) No and yes: on the genesis of human communication. 
International Universities Press, New York
Tomasello M (2000) The social-pragmatic theory of word learning. 
Pragmatics 10(4):401–413
Tomasello M (2003) Constructing a language: a usage-based theory of 
language acquisition. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Vanman EJ, Kappas A (2019) “Danger, will robinson!” the challenges 
of social robots for intergroup relations. Soc Pers Psychol Com-
pass 13(8):e12489
Varela FG, Maturana HR, Uribe R (1974) Autopoiesis: the organization 
of living systems, its characterization and a model. Biosystems 
5(4):187–196
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to 
jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
